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Abstract. This article considers, from a contextual and poststructuralist perspective, due 
process in The Memoirs of Stephen Calvert by the early American novelist (and trained 
lawyer) Charles Brockden Brown. Brown’s writing, the article suggests, participates in 
the thematic and rhetorical interface between law and literature. For although his fiction 
is fragmentary and nightmarish, moving from gothic cities to treacherous frontiers, the 
narration of transgressions and the law remain constant tropes. Thus, lawyers, conmen, 
criminals, and doppelgangers appear and reappear in works such as Stephen Calvert. 
The article focuses on how Brown puts the principles of the rights of the accused on trial 
in this posthumously published novel, for characters are identified as criminals in clear 
violation of the Fifth Amendment which requires an articulation of the charges that are 
brought against the accused.  In this, Stephen Calvert poses considerable legal questions: 
How are charges articulated?  How are they presented in narrative form?  And what 
happens when crimes are said to be “unspeakable”?  The interrogation of these 
questions is highly significant in a new nation that upholds the procedural due process of 
law. 
 
 
 
 
 
“It has been usual to subject [the accused] to some appearance of trial, the objects of 
persecution; to furnish them with an intelligible statement of their offences; to summon 
them to an audience of their judges; and to found their sentence on some evidence real or 
pretended; but these rulers were actuated by no other impulse than vengeance.” 
 
--Charles Brockden Brown, “Man at Home” 82 
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 “The profession of law is neither liberal nor respectable.” 
 
 
    --Charles Brockden Brown, “A Series of Original Letters” 111 
 
 
 In his influential book Law and Letters in American Culture (1984), Robert A. 
Ferguson correctly asserts that the relationship between law and literature is vital for 
understanding “America’s first major novelist,” Charles Brockden Brown.  Indeed, 
Ferguson writes that in 1793 “Brown rejected the law as his profession after six years 
study in the Philadelphia law office of Alexander Wilcocks” in favor of writing fiction 
(129). Following this career change, Brown feverishly wrote several gothic novels, 
including Wieland (1798), Ormond (1799), Arthur Mervyn (1799-1800), Edgar Huntly 
(1799) and The Memoirs of Stephen Calvert (1799-1800). This latter work, though, has 
been overlooked by literary critics, including those interested in the intersections of law 
and literature.2  In fact, of the few modern critics to take up Stephen Calvert, only one -- 
Robert A. Ferguson -- touches on the legal discourses of the novel.  This is particularly 
surprising when we consider that most of the male characters in Stephen Calvert are 
lawyers, and the interactions between these characters often pivot upon accusation and 
acquittal, testimony and judgment.  Ferguson does an effective job of dealing with the 
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 Maurice J. Bennett has, for instance, written an interesting study of Brown’s Stephen 
Calvert as an exploration of the development of the eighteenth-century artist in the 
United States; Hans Borchers reads the novel as echoing the contemporary 
psychological theories of love and emotion put forward by Erasmus Darwin and 
Benjamin Rush (xx-xxiv); Caleb Crain analyses the relationship between Felix and 
Stephen as including erotic and political tensions (130-2); and Norman S. Grabo looks at 
the psychological and symbolic figure of the double, suggesting that Stephen Calvert 
explores the familiar Brownian themes of confused identities and erroneous 
eyewitnesses (155). 
autobiographical content of the novel, and he correctly points out that the text “illustrates 
the close parallels to Brown’s own vocational problems with the law” (134).  Ferguson 
sees the relationship between Sidney (the lawyer) and Stephen (the literary recluse) as 
Brown’s attempt to dramatize his own divided vocations: his familial obligations to study 
the law and his own desire to pursue a literary career.  Both vocations, though, come up 
short.  The lawyer is represented as ubiquitous and yet erroneous in his judgments of 
others, while the literary man has a mind that is “distorted [by] crude conceptions, and 
passions lawless and undisciplined” (205).  
 Ferguson’s autobiographical reading is convincing, but his focus casts our gaze 
away from the more general proliferation of legal discourse that runs throughout Stephen 
Calvert. After all, the language, rhetoric and form of the text move from the submission 
of a plea to the articulation of a confession to the casting of judgment.  In this sense, the 
novel often reads like a court proceeding, for the dialogues adopt legal language and 
Stephen’s narrative voice frequently takes on the diction of jurisprudence.  Sydney is, for 
instance, repeatedly condemned by Stephen as an “unwise counselor” who is “guilty of 
injustice” (171). Stephen, too, is “frequently compelled to answer [the] interrogatories” of 
Louisa, to which he must “persuade [him]self that concealment is but justice to [his] 
cousin” (173-4).  And Clelia is said to be examined, cross-examined and asked to provide 
a testimony of her presumably transgressive motives and acts: “She ought,” Sydney 
proclaims, “to have an opportunity of avowing her integrity...  My evidence I cannot 
produce.  The information was given on condition that the authors were concealed... 
[But] the evidence was such as not to be resisted” (229).  Evidence, guilt, testimony and 
justice pervade the novel’s dialogues, indicating that the text is never far from the 
discursive jurisdiction of the law. 
For instance, in the opening paragraph of The Memoirs of Stephen Calvert, 
Stephen attempts to justify and explain his self-imposed exile.  He states, 
 
Yes, my friend, I admit the justice of your claim.  There is but one mode of 
appeasing your wonder at my present condition, and that is the relation of the 
events of my life. This will amply justify my choice of an abode in these 
mountainous and unvisited recesses, and explain why I thus anxiously shut out 
from my retreat the footsteps and society of men” (71). 
 
Here, Stephen suggests that he has sequestered himself from society and imposed 
sanctions on himself for a crime that he does not divulge.  He chooses “solitude and 
labour” as a way of repenting for the “corruption,” “idleness,” and “evils of his life. But 
the language used in this passage is a mixture of testimony, confession and accusation. 
For Stephen’s comments read like an affidavit that addresses the reader as both judge and 
jury. It is almost as if Stephen is speaking from the witness box: he is offering his 
evidence by giving an account of the events that have led to the unuttered charges of the 
unknown accuser, whom he refers to as “friend.”  At the same time, though, we are left to 
wonder about the origin of his transgressions, for the text lacks testimony on the crimes 
that have led to the sentencing of his exile.  As a result, the text that announces itself as a 
“memoir” is really an incomplete witness testimony; it is a narrative that frames itself as 
a response to a series of incriminations and indictments, accusations and charges that are 
never articulated fully.
3
   
 Stephen’s guilt echoes Clithero’s self condemnation in Brown’s earlier novel, 
Edgar Huntly. In both cases the men accuse, convict and incarcerate themselves in the 
penal colony of the forest.  However, their respective testimonies are quite different: 
Clithero offers a narrative of his crimes, but Stephen remains silent about his offenses.  
We know that Clithero attempted to murder his guardian, but we only know that Stephen 
was subject to the “habits of corruption and idleness” and the “evils of temptation” (71).  
What are his crimes?  Why has he accused himself of these offenses?  And does his self-
imposed punishment suit his transgressions?  These questions remain open; Stephen 
declines to provide any answers, and refuses to speak of his malfeasance beyond the 
bounds of generalization and abstraction.  From this perspective, Stephen’s crimes 
remain an invoked absence, for his narrative seeks to reconstruct the events that led up to 
the accusation--attempting to justify his self-imposed exile and account for his suspected 
misdeeds--without ever identifying the crimes for which he is charged. 
 What I want to suggest here is that the silence surrounding Stephen’s crimes is a 
synecdoche for the entire text. This is because, throughout the narrative, accusations are 
followed by silence, for when guilt is pronounced the specificities of the specificities of 
the crimes are not disclosed. For instance, Stephen’s father, Stephen Sr., is judged and 
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 The issue of silence in positive law has recently been examined by Marianne Constable 
in Just Silences (2005). In fact, my reading of Brown’s work corresponds to Constable’s 
assertion that we must “listen to what is not positivist in law, to what is not clearly 
articulated and articulable at law, and to what is just” (13). After all, positivist claims 
about justice are not normative or prescriptive, and in refusing to relegate the justice of 
law to empirically social realities, it reveals a multiplicity of legal silences. These 
silences have, Constable argues, “possible implications for justice at precisely the limits 
of positive law, where the language of power and the power of language run out” (14).     
executed without ever being informed of his offenses or having an opportunity to defend 
himself against his accuser. Likewise, Clelia’s husband, Belgrave, is charged with 
unutterable corruption, intolerable wrongdoings and flagrant guilt that remain covert and 
mysterious, and Louisa’s father, Ambrose, cruelly whips and brutally punishes his slaves 
without divulging the trespasses for which they are being punished. Finally, Louise tells 
Stephen that he is guilty of abominable crimes that she can neither articulate nor forgive.  
In this, Stephen Calvert turns on legal discourse, revolving around the legal concepts of 
due process and the rights of the accused, while simultaneously unmasking the limits of 
representation that lie beneath the letter of the law. 
 
*      *      * 
  
 Peter Brooks has demonstrated that silence is crucial to an understanding of how 
the law intersects with storytelling and the construction of narrative within a legal 
context. After all, the narratives of prosecution and defense in the courtroom necessarily 
include both the rhetorical devices needed to tell a convincing story and the concealment 
– or silences – of conflicting elements. “Narrative,” as Brooks has observed, “is indeed 
omnipresent in the law” and yet the “notion of a well-for-med narrative…is misleading in 
the court of law, for it leads jurors to believe that real-life stories must obey the same 
rules of coherence” (16, 18). Thus, gaps and silences arise in the pursuit of logical 
narrative conclusion and this is, I suggest, significant to my reading of Stephen Calvert.  
For legal storytelling in Brown’s text foregrounds omission and erasure, which, in turn, 
lead to contradiction and confusion rather than order and clarity.  The argument of one 
character is always met by the counter-argument of another; the testimony of one witness 
is contradicted by the experience of someone else; and the adjudication of an authority is 
challenged by the appeal of a defendant. In addition, these proceedings lack order and do 
not end in conclusive results, for the spectre of the double and the theme of mistaken 
identity haunts the text.  Instead of order, we find an uncanny vision of the dark mysteries 
of the self in which the boundaries separating self and other are not clearly defined.  
From this perspective, the figure of the double functions like the passing figure, for they 
both call attention to the instability of the self and the incoherence of individuality.  
However, in Stephen Calvert, it is not just that characters cannot tell who Stephen/Felix 
really is; it is also that Stephen/Felix cannot find anyone who can tell him who he is.  In 
this, the double is a source of disorder precisely because Stephen is seen to be estranged 
from himself.  Or, to put it another way, “I” is another, and the Other inhabits 
Stephen/Felix while simultaneously remaining displaced and distant. 
 Stephen Calvert, then, displaces the question of jurisdiction (Where did the crime 
take place?) and transgression (What law was broken?) to the question posed by the 
doubled figure who must confront his fractured identity: Who am I?, Stephen asks. This 
reformulation of legal discourse gestures toward the limits of the law: if a person cannot 
clearly answer this question, then how can he identify the crime he has committed?  After 
all, accusations rely on clear-cut identifications of the criminal, for the crime must be 
allocated to a perpetrator.  This procedure is made clear under U.S. law: the designation 
of guilt must begin with the identification of the suspect or criminal, after which the 
crime must be plainly communicated to him in order that the accused might have an 
opportunity to respond to the charges and call witnesses in his defense.   
These procedures, though, are called into question throughout Stephen Calvert.  
For instance, when Stephen Sr. is falsely accused of betraying his father, he is accused, 
tried, convicted and executed without being informed of his crimes or given an 
opportunity to defend himself.  Instead, Stephen Sr. receives a vague and flawed 
indictment just prior to his execution: 
 
 Sir, 
You need not be informed of your offenses: you know that they surpass 
those of the greatest criminals whose guilt has been recorded.  You have rebelled 
against your God; you have been a traitor to your rightful prince; and, finally, you 
have done all that in you lay, to bring your father to the scaffold.  What 
punishment do you think you deserve?--Tremble!--Vengeance, though so long 
delayed, is now preparing to crush you! (91) 
 
This letter is not addressed, dated or signed.  Hence, the identity of the author who carries 
out the judgment and the sentencing remains undisclosed.  Determining the authority who 
claims to have jurisdiction here can only be done by piecing together the context of the 
letter: we can only assume that the charges are put forward by Sir Stephen (his father) 
under the false suspicion that his son has foiled his plot to assassinate King George II and 
aid the return of Prince Charles to the throne.  One offense is met by the accusation of 
another; one who is suspected of a crime accuses another of greater guilt.  But the crimes 
in this case--like the identities of the addressor and addressee--are never specified.  A 
vague description of the offense is outlined, but Stephen Sr. is never fully informed of his 
trespasses, thus leading the accused to speculate about the charges.  In this, Stephen Sr. is 
denied a forum in which he can testify in his own defense, confront his accuser, or offer a 
testimony that would refute the charges against him.    
 
*      *      * 
 
 The procedural lapses in the case against Stephen Sr. flies in the face of American 
constitutional law and the rights of the accused.  The fifth amendment of the U. S. 
Constitution protects these rights. “In all criminal prosecutions,” the founding document 
states, “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Council for his 
defense” (Declaration 44; my emphasis).  Evidently, this paragraph is meant to guard 
against the kind of prosecution and judgment experienced by Stephen Sr.  For the 
amendment makes oblique accusations redundant under the law and maintains the 
importance of charges being conveyed in an overt fashion, upholding a transparent 
procedure that adheres to the basic rights of the accused. 
 The fifth amendment, then, is a crucial part of due process, a legal concept that 
places limitations on laws and legal proceedings in order to guarantee fundamental 
fairness, justice and liberty.  Due process is designed to protect the rights of the accused 
and maintains that “no person shall be...derived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law” (Declaration 44). Of course the term “due process” existed long before 
1791 when it was inserted into the U. S. Constitution and can be traced back to Chapter 
29 of the Magna Carta, which states that “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or 
disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any 
other wise destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful 
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land” (Orth ix). By the end of the fourteenth 
century, “law of the land” and “due process of law” were considered virtually 
synonymous in England. According to the seventeenth-century English jurist Sir Edward 
Coke, for instance, the liberty to pursue a livelihood and would not be otherwise be 
deprived but by legem terrae, the law of the land, “that is, by the common law, statute 
law, or custom of England… (that is, to speak once and for all) by the due course, and 
process of law” (46). Both the writings of Coke and the Magna Carta influenced the 1704 
ruling by the Queen’s Bench (during the reign of Queen Anne) in the case of Regina v. 
Paty, in which it was revealed that the House of Commons had wrongly imprisoned John 
Paty and other citizens merely for the offence of pursuing a legal action in the courts. In 
this case, Justice Powys of the Queen’s Bench explained the meaning of “due process of 
law” by invoking “Mag. Chart. C. 29, whereby no man ought to be taken or imprisoned, 
but by the law of the land” and that “lex terrae is not confined to common law, but takes 
in all other laws” and “the words lex terrae…are explained by the words due process of 
law; and the meaning of the statute is, that all commitments must be by a legal authority” 
(Reports 1105).       
 In the early United States, the expressions “due process” and “law of the land” 
were often used interchangeably. The 1776 Constitution of Maryland, for instance, 
included a clause taken from the Magna Carta, including the expression “law of the land” 
(Collection 36). Likewise, the New York statutory bill of rights enacted in 1787 included 
four different due process clauses, which Alexander Hamilton justified by stating that the 
words “due process” had a “precise technical import” that must be invoked in a variety of 
contexts (Hamilton 174). Following this, the state of New York proposed the addition of 
“due process” language to the U.S. Constitution, and in response James Madison drafted 
the due process clause for Congress, which was adopted after Madison explained the 
clause in relation to the Magna Carta. During the first sixty years after the ratification of 
the U. S. Constitution, the due process clause was confined to a procedural meaning – a 
situation that did not change until the fourteenth amendment was adopted in 1856.  
Due process, then, ensures the individual’s right to be adequately notified of 
charges or proceedings involving him, and the opportunity to be heard at these 
proceedings.  Criminal prosecutions and civil cases are thus governed by explicit 
guarantees of rights under the Bill of Rights, which protects the rights of the accused at 
the state level.  While the Constitution does not lay out specific procedures that must be 
followed in government proceedings, due process provides a minimum floor of protection 
to the individual that statutes, regulations, and enforced actions must meet to ensure that 
no one is deprived of basic rights arbitrarily or without opportunity to affect the judgment 
and result.  This minimum protection extends to all government proceedings that can 
result in an individual’s deprivation, whether it be in a civil or a criminal prosecution. 
This was to some extent an outgrowth of the common law’s philosophical reliance on 
natural law and the idea that some laws could be “unlawful.”  The intent of writing due 
process into the U.S. Constitution was to impose limits not only on how laws were passed 
and enforced, but also on what kinds of laws that were imposed by majorities upon 
minorities as well as individuals. Just what these rights are, though, is not always clear.  
For throughout U.S. legal history, due process has protected rights such as marriage and 
the raising children, and it has upheld the extension of the Bill of Rights over the States.  
However, the lack of clarity surrounding the exact content of these rights has lead to 
many of legal debates.
4
    
 The question of due process protecting minorities in the United States was first 
raised in the Quock Walker case.
5
  In 1781, Quock Walker, a slave, escaped from 
Nataniel Jennison and took refuge on a Massachusetts farm belonging to Seth and John 
Caldwell.  Walker and his parents had been purchased by the Caldwells’ older brother in 
1754.  When the elder Caldwell died, Walker had become the property of his widow, who 
later married Jennison. After the marriage, it was not clear who owned Walker. Was he 
owned by the widow? Was he the property of Mr. Jennison? Or was he a free man?  
Whatever the answer may be, Walker’s liberty on the Caldwell farm was short-lived: he 
was soon recaptured by Jennison, severely beaten, and forced back into bondage. But 
Quock Walker fought back by filing suit against Jennison for assault and battery.  In this 
case, the jury ruled in favour of Walker, for they found him to be “a Freeman and not the 
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 One of the most famous legal debates on this issue was Dred Scott v. Sandford, in 
which Dred Scott, a slave, argued that passing through territory wherein slavery was 
prohibited destroyed his owner’s property rights over him.  In this case, the Supreme 
Court held that due process protections of property restricted certain types of laws that 
would take away property, not merely the procedure by which it was taken 
(Higginbotham 91-97). 
5 This series of judicial cases, based on the 1790 state constitution, successfully 
challenged the legality of slavery in Massachusetts.  Although chattel slavery continued 
to exist in Massachusetts, the Quock Walker decision indicated that it would no longer 
be supported by the state courts.  The case was widely publicized and it was a 
significant ruling for two reasons: first, it legally maintained the freedom of blacks in the 
state; and, second, it was one of the first instances in which a written constitution was 
applied directly as law (Fehrenbacher 39). 
proper Negro slave” of Jennison, awarding Walker fifty pounds in damages.  This ruling 
led to another trial, Commonwealth v. Jennison, in which the defendant was once again 
indicted and charged with assault and battery against Walker (Zilvermit 114).  The 
Attorney General argued that Jennison was aware that Walker’s original master had 
promised to set him free when he reached the age of twenty-five and, as a consequence, 
Jennison had attacked a free man. Jennison’s lawyer argued that his client had a right to 
hold Walker in bondage based on the law of Coveture, which transferred the possession 
of a woman to her husband at the time of marriage. He also argued that the 1780 
Massachusetts constitution did not specifically prohibit slavery and that Walker was 
Jennison’s legal proverty. But Chief Justice William Cushing and the jury held that, 
based on due process, the constitution granted rights that were incompatible with slavery.  
In the verdict, Jennison was found guilty of assault and battery, setting a precedent 
whereby the due process protection of life, liberty and property was applied to Walker.  
By extension, the ruling implied that due process held the laws of slavery to be unlawful 
under the state constitution, and the due process clause was embraced by judge and jury 
to protect the rights that were implicit in the “ordered liberty” of Walker (Zilvermit 115). 
 Brown would have been familiar with this high-profile case and the controversial 
ruling of the court.  Thus, it is not surprising that Stephen Calvert explores this case in the 
depiction of Ambrose Calvert, a tyrannical slaveholder who takes great pleasure in 
brutally beating his slaves.  He is said to enjoy inflicting the “deep traces of the lash,” as 
well as raping his female slaves.  According to the narrator,   
 
His [Ambrose’s] fields were cultivated by Africans.... His disposition was remote 
from avarice, but it was savage and capricious.  He inflicted upon them the most 
excruciating punishments for the most trifling offences.  He made little or no 
discrimination in the choice of objects of his wrath. No tenderness of age or sex, 
no degree of fidelity or diligence, exempted from suffering the unfortunate beings 
who were placed under his yoke.  His imagination created crimes when they were 
wanting; and that was an inexpiable offence at one time, which, at another, was 
laudable or indifferent.  When in a sullen mood, merely to smile in his presence 
was guilt, and incurred inhuman chastisement. (99) 
 
A despotic slave driver, Ambrose determines the law of the plantation, and places himself 
in the position of judge, jury and punisher. Under his jurisdiction, there is of course a 
marked absence of due process, and this lack arises here precisely because there are no 
limits on how the laws are passed or enforced: the law in this region is fluid, malleable 
and constantly under construction and re-construction.  On Ambrose’s plantation--as on 
all plantations--there can be no protection of rights, freedoms or liberties, for these 
concepts are seen to be foreign to the institution of slavery, and exiled to the territories 
beyond the legal limits of Calverton. 
 Part of Ambrose’s despotism arises from the fact that he refuses to inform the 
punished slave of the nature of his or her transgression.  In fact, due process has no place 
here; for Ambrose, the voice of the law, conjures the transgressions of his slaves, and 
conceals the guilty conduct of the accused in order to perpetuate an aura of mystery 
surrounding the proceedings of accusation, judgment and sentencing.  In this, the law of 
Calverton is always transformative and, as such, it questions the conventional notions of 
the law which are, determined by an imagined set of formalized regulations and an 
interpretive schema that produces interpretations in accordance with a procedural 
protocol.  In this respect, the law serves institutional ends and interrogates, among other 
things, the motive, action and plotting of a transgression.  Assumptions and limitations in 
this practice are outlined in the procedural due process, but any ruptures in this system 
expose the ease with which the transformation of institutional ends can occur. To put this 
another way, the law fluidly moves from the transparency of clear-cut regulation and 
procedure to an uncanny transformative figure that is illusive and ungraspable.  The 
subversion of the law’s assumed clarity, then, produces a sense of that which is strangely 
familiar, a sense of losing one’s bearings and becoming disoriented by a certain 
undecidability that infects the law. 
 From this perspective, the only deducible and procedural principles in the law are 
discerned against a background of a deafening silence, and the law’s citationality is not 
innocuous but detrimental, perpetuating ideologies and agendas that are dressed up in the 
language of justice and higher law.  Here, the law dictates fictitious conditions, so that 
one cannot pretend that innate, ubiquitous, knowable laws govern human activity. On the 
Calverton plantation, for instance, the meaning of the law is derived from the social 
machine of language and political agendas.  Hence, meaning manifests itself in systems, 
and these systems are both provisional and project an illusory efficacy.  They are 
provisional in that they refer to the temporal grounding of meaning that derives from and 
governs the fluctuating context that enacts and respects meaning.  The illusory efficacy of 
meaning attempts to subjugate all others and announces itself in the name of what is 
“natural” or seemingly immanent.  In short, the law of Calverton functions in a mis en 
abime fashion, stressing the slipperiness of language and the assessment of legal 
meaning. The law is, in other words, grounded in a prelocating tumult of temporality and 
context. 
 
*      *      * 
 
 The marked absence of due process on Calverton is mirrored in the covert charges 
lodged against Clelia.  Here, the text links chattel slavery with the bondage of women in 
marriage, highlighting the unjust laws that perpetuate the exploitation of women in 
patriarchy.  In passages that remind us of Brown’s 1798 dialogue Alcuin, Clelia, 
Belgrave’s wife, is said to be “charged directly” with “misconducts” that violate the 
institution of marriage (230).  But Sydney, the lawyer and voice for the prosecution, 
never articulates the specific crimes for which she is charged. Is she accused of adultery? 
Is she charged with betraying her husband? Sydney hints that this might be the case, but 
he does not confirm this.  Instead, he speaks in generalizations, saying only that he is 
“convinced...of her guilt” and that he has “indubitable evidence” of transgressions that 
must remain concealed (228-9).  Stephen is confounded by these covert charges: “What 
was her crime?,” he asks; to which no reply is given (199). In place of an explanation, 
Sydney cryptically states that detectives have monitored Clelia’s daily activities, and that 
witness testimony has declared her to be guilty.  Guilty of what?  Sydney never says, but 
he condemns her as “a vile criminal” and tells Stephen that he is “convinced of her 
depravity” (230). 
 Clelia responds with a summons.  She demands that Stephen visit her at home so 
that she can enter a plea of innocence and defend herself against the mysterious charges.  
“I beseech you,” she writes to Stephen, “afford me the opportunity of justifying my 
conduct.  You know me merely as a fugitive from my husband and my country, and you 
impute to me all that is criminal and odious; but the true reasons for my actions will shew 
[sic] you that I am not without excuse” (199-200).  Stephen complies with the summons.  
But Clelia’s plea only compounds mystery, for her defense perpetuates covert charges by 
accusing others of dark crimes and unspeakable acts.  In fact, Clelia defends herself by 
charging her husband, Belgrave, with a “nameless something,” an affront to the 
“animadversions of the law” (202, 205).  In so doing, she condemns him for transgressing 
the law, but she conceals his crimes. “Cohabitating with him,” she says, “I [have] became 
acquainted with transactions and scenes, which, at a distance, could not possibly have 
been suspected.  Under the veil of darkness, propensities were indulged by my husband, 
that I have not a name which I can utter.  They cannot be thought of without horror.  
They cannot be related” (203-4).  This mix of defense, accusation and deferral 
simultaneously reveals and conceals Belgrave’s actions.  But revelation soon gives way 
to suppression when Stephen presses Clelia to disclose the specific transgressions that she 
has witnessed: “I cannot utter it--I was frozen with horror. I doubted whether hideous 
phantoms, produced by my own imagination, had not deceived me; till my memory, 
putting past incidents together, convinced me that they were real... The world would 
never believe the wrongs which I had endured, and which, indeed, would never know the 
most odious of these wrongs” (205).6    
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 Stephen Spapiro’s reading of the erotics of Edgar Huntly correctly points to this 
 What are these odious wrongs?  What crime has Belgrave committed?  And how, 
more generally, can anyone be charged with an unspeakable offense?  By finding him 
guilty in the extreme, Clelia seeks to acquit herself of equally mysterious wrongdoings.  
As a result, the rhetoric of these passages generates feelings concerned with the liminal 
and other sorts of uncertainty, with darkness, and with a sense of a transgression that is so 
secret that it is best to leave it untouched.  Clelia, then, implies that Belgrave’s crimes are 
so horrific that they ought to remain hidden.  They should be suppressed and repressed, 
hidden from the light of reality, in the form of a secret story that can never be told.  Her 
account, in short, presents us with an effacement.  For she effaces the nature and cause of 
the accusation, leaving the charges unknowable, enigmatic and inexplicable.  Belgrave’s 
crimes are thus bound up in an intellectual and legal uncertainty that haunts us with an 
ominous darkness, a sense that he has transgressed boundaries that go beyond the borders 
of speech or the letter of the law.  
 Stephen, then, is asked to judge Belgrave’s unspeakable transgressions. In this, he 
is forced to rely on his imagination to fill in the gaps and elisions in Clelia’s testimony: 
the imaginary must come to stand in for the reality of the alleged crime.  Stephen is, in 
essence, faced with an effacement of the boundaries separating the imagination from 
reality that produces an uncanny effect, and his situation calls attention to the fact that 
“reality” and “imagination” are not mutually exclusive, but fundamentally linked in terms 
of displacements, disturbances and refigurations of the imaginary and the real.  Clelia’s 
concealment articulates the experience of reading Belgrave’s transgression as a cryptic, 
                                                                                                                                                 
passage in Stephen Calvert as “the first U.S. literary indication of the ‘open 
secret’ about what cannot be declared, for Neville’s horror is not merely at the 
primal scene of Belgrave’s homoerotics, but his brazen refusal to be ashamed” 
(234). 
private and unverifiable mode of interrogation and interpretation.  The secret generates a 
special obtuseness of its own that disturbs her position as a reliable witness or as an 
allegedly detached and objective observer.  But her concealment also accentuates the 
very effacement with which the law cannot be associated: her silence undoes any 
certainty about what is real and what is not, about where the imagination ends and the 
real begins.  
 We are, like Stephen, drawn into a strange silence, a solitude comprised of the 
unspeakable, into a world where, we perhaps discover, we can imagine a darkness that 
cannot be spoken.  Clelia does not identify Belgrave’s transgression or even the means by 
which she has come to discover it.  She leaves us in the dark.  What are we to make of 
this?  Does she remain silent because she believes that she will be corrupted by uttering 
the crimes of another?  Or does she omit the information because she knows that the 
imagination will conjure transgressions much more shocking than those which are put 
into language?  It is possible that Clelia is concerned for us not to know more details 
about Belgrave’s guilt.  Like Carwin in Brown’s Wieland, it might be said, Clelia is at 
once revealing through confession and concealing through silence.  But, unlike Carwin, 
she does this by suppressing the specificities of another’s crime, and tries to gain 
immunity for herself by exposing her husband’s guilt in an imaginative fashion. 
 
*      *      * 
 
 Caleb Crain convincingly argues that Belgrave’s unutterable crimes are a direct 
reference to sodomy. “Stephen Calvert is,” he writes, “the one piece of his fiction where 
Brown broaches the topic of sodomy” (131).  Textual evidence certainly supports this 
reading, for Belgrave’s unspeakable crimes are said to be committed with other men in 
the confines of his private closet. Moreover, His very name--Belgrave--is the death-like 
imagery that homophobically associates sodomy with the grave.  In his article “Is the 
Rectum a Grave?,” for instance, Leo Bersani writes that the “asshole” has been aligned 
with effeminate gay male sexuality, and it is “the heterosexual association of anal sex 
with a self-annihilation originally and primarily identified with the phantasmic mystery 
of an insatiable, unstoppable female sexuality” (22). In Brown’s day, “preterition was the 
conventional way to represent sodomy,” and the words unutterable and unspeakable 
became a form of coded discourse to characterize the crime (Crain 131). As a 
consequence, this coded discourse, this preterition, was “written into” the law itself.  In a 
unique statute of 1793, for instance, the State of Maryland adopted a penalty for sodomy 
applicable only to males, defining the act as “that most horrid and detestable crime 
(among Christians not to be named,) called Sodomy” (emphasis in original).  This crime, 
which could not to be named and yet could be called something, followed on the 
definition of sodomy in English common law, which also labeled the transgression as 
something unspeakable.  In both cases, the letter of the law could not name the crime, 
thus framing it as something mysterious, unidentifiable and beyond representation.  
However, in the United States, under the due process laws of the fifth amendment, a 
crime needed to be named and clearly identified when a charge was being made.  But 
how could this be done in the sodomy cases of the 1790s?  For in such cases, according 
to the letter of the law, this crime was unspeakable. 
 This situation calls attention to the legal fictions of due process and the rights of 
the accused.  Due process necessitates the articulation of a crime, but the unspeakable 
nature of sodomy suggests that it is also unwritable, unreadable and enigmatic.  Sodomy, 
then, exists outside the frontiers of legal discourse and it is exiled from the body of texts 
that comprises the law.  Under such circumstances, it should be excluded from the 
hegemonic rationalism and imagined coherence that constitutes a law.  For when the 
1793 Maryland statute refers to sodomy as that which is “unnameable,” the law frames it 
as a text of the laspse linguae par excellence, a text that slips over the signified and calls 
for an analysis that can never be conclusive.  To put this another way, the unnameable 
thing called sodomy begs for analysis, and, in so doing, it gestures toward an illusive and 
analytic discourse that challenges the single-axis framework of the law. By speaking of 
sodomy as unnameable, the statute puts into practice a reading of the signifier other than 
in terms of the signified--that is, other than in the terms of the word that is being 
communicated. This implies that sodomy is beyond the limits of signification and, as a 
result, it is at once infinitely analysable and represents a limit for analysis.  This is 
because the thing called sodomy in legal language simultaneously produces and 
pulverizes meaning: the word pushes beyond the limits of the thinkable, the representable 
and the discursive as such, while the law also makes claims to having a pre-discursive 
domain.  
 But if the naming of the crime was thought to be impossible, prosecution for 
sodomy was conceived as achievable.  Under the law of Maryland, for instance, this 
inscrutable crime carried with it an explicit and harsh punishment. Those men charged 
with this offense could be brought before a justice of the peace who could hand down the 
sentence of  
 
labour for any time, in their discretion, not exceeding seven years for the same 
crime...and the said justices may procure a proper place or places for the 
confinement of such criminals...and to keep them, (and if necessary, secure them 
with irons), to constant hard labour...and any one of the said justices shall have 
full power to order any of the said criminals to be close confined, and whipped, 
not exceeding thirty-nine lashes. 
 
This brutal sentence could be issued without any definition of the very word being used 
to charge or convict the defendant.  In fact, this particular statute was accompanied by a 
separate provision that mandated a penalty of death for any slave who committed 
sodomy. In Brown’s home state of Pennsylvania, a similar penalty was also on the books 
as early as 1718: any man, regardless of colour, could face capital punishment if 
convicted of sodomy.
7
 This maximum sentence was used in 1785 when Joseph Ross of 
Westmoreland County was sentenced to die on December 20, 1785 for an “unspecified 
act of indecency.”8  
 It is crucial that the court documents in the Ross case refer to his act as 
“unspecified” and indecency.  For the verdict gestures toward the consequences and 
                                                 
7
 In Maryland, the death penalty for a slave convicted of sodomy could be 
commuted by a justice of the peace to a sentence of hard labour for up to 
fourteen years, a sentence twice that for free persons. 
8
 According to legal historians, this is the only known execution in Pennsylvania 
for sodomy. 
effects of that which is inexpressible and unameable and helps us to witness the 
unsymbolizable competing with the symbolizable to suggest that every sign of difference 
is equivalent to its own deferral.  But the law, by not naming and yet calling the 
transgression a crime, simultaneously recognizes the limits of the signifiable and tries to 
bring the unsignifiable under the auspices of the symbolic order.  This is necessary 
because the regulation of desire and the act that is defined as a transgression must, in 
some way, be written down in the letter of the law.  In this sense, the law always 
privileges the logic of the signifier, even when it broaches that which is said to be 
unsymbolizable.   
 
*      *      * 
 
 In Stephen Calvert, though, the importance of naming the charge for which one is 
accused also arises in relation to transgressions other than sodomy.  Louisa, for instance, 
condemns Stephen of crimes that she does not name.  “I dismiss my hopes of you,” she 
says to Stephen, “this instance of depravity and falsehood exceeds what my worst fears 
had painted” (234).  Stephen then asks to be heard, so that he might defend himself 
against the charges: 
 
“Good heaven!  What is the ground of your belief? You will not surely 
condemn me unheard?” 
  “I have no doubts.” 
  “No doubt of my depravity?” 
  “Alas! none.” 
 “Let me then take away from your sight, a wretch who is not even worthy 
to be heard in his own defense.” 
  She wept and sobbed... 
 “And is it come to this?  Shall I not, at least, know my crime?”   
“Your crime cannot but be known to you.  Would you have me blast my 
own ears by repeating it?”.... 
My thoughts insensibly acquired firmness and consistency.  Of those 
atrocious charges I was innocent.  I knew not what the charges were.  I cared not 
to know.  If I were not worthy to be heard, to be informed of my offences, I would 
trample, in my turn, on such injustice; I would leave my vindication to time, to 
chance.  (235-6, my italics)   
 
What we have here are a series of silences and silencings that surround the charges and 
judgments put forward by Louisa.  After all, Louisa chooses to remain silent concerning 
why she has condemned Stephen, thus concealing the charge under a veil of secrecy.  Her 
silencing, then, engenders other silences, for Stephen is left with no choice but to remain 
mute in the face of the accusation; he cannot challenge the charge--or indeed the silence 
itself--until the crime has been articulated and revealed to him. 
 These silences perpetuate confusion.  By having no means to refute the 
allegations, Stephen cannot uncover the mistaken identity that is generating false 
impressions.  For it is Stephen’s double, his lost twin, Felix, who should be held 
accountable for the unuttered transgressions.  Yet the silence surrounding the accusation 
means that the figure of the double baffles investigation, and creates false witnesses that 
muddle the coherence of legal authority.  In this, the doubled figure suggests that nothing 
is more fleeting than the search whose movement constitutes the labyrinth that 
investigates it. But this investigation is necessarily filled with a sense of strangeness due 
to the dissemination of secrecy and unfamiliarity.  To put this another way, the double 
compromises the law because it comprises the uncanny experience of being after oneself.  
How can the law investigate that which the suspect has done and yet simultaneously not 
done?  Such an investigation will lead to the labyrinth of duplicity, or, as Nicholas Royle 
puts it, “the regulation of a strange economy, an art of negotiation which presupposes a 
kind of double talk” that will bewilder an effective interrogation (17). 
 In Stephen Calvert, then, the figure of the double calls forth a “lawful versus 
transgressive” distinction.  In so doing, the moments of greatest heuristic power in the 
text occur through the confused acts of witnessing and interpreting that militate against 
this distinction.  Unsettling the ground of both poles (lawful and transgressive), the text 
entails the experience of a suspended relation, for the double does not necessarily 
presuppose the identity and meaning of that which is witnessed.  Rather, doubles resist 
the fixity of a binarized ontological status and gesture toward a certain indecidability that 
affects and infects the witness so that they can mean something other than they are.   
 Fixity is challenged precisely because the double is construed as a foreign body 
within oneself, or even the experience of oneself as a foreign body, the very estrangement 
of inner silence and solitude. This has to do with a sense of the self as double, split, at 
odds with itself, as well as the detection of a foreignness in oneself.  Such a recognition, a 
glimpse at ontological uncertainty, is pointed to in the fact that Stephen Calvert is a 
fiction, a self-remarking fiction, dressed up as a memoir.  It is a text about a double with 
a title that is thus double, narrated moreover by one who describes his name as a fictitious 
title: “My original appellation was Stephen,” he tells us, “but henceforth I was called 
Felix” (88).  The name is thus his double’s title and his own, and suggests that the name 
itself is double, the double is already in the name.  After all, Derrida reminds us that “a 
proper name does not name anything which is human, which belongs to a human body, a 
human spirit, an essence of man.  And yet this relation to the inhuman only befalls man, 
for him, to him, in the name of man.  He alone gives himself this inhuman name” 
(“Aphorism” 427).  Here, the name itself is a doubling process, for the act of naming is 
synonymous with the act of othering--merging I and another--and identifying the human 
with the inhuman. 
 And yet the fixity of the law relies upon the fixity of the subject: the naming of 
the crime and the naming of the one who is charged with committing the crime.  The 
charges, then, are not inseparable from Stephen’s name--which identifies the 
transgressor--but his name is not his own, just as his alleged crimes are not his own and 
his actions are at once his and not his.  Thus, Stephen’s narration testifies to this structure 
of doubling or “being-two-to-speak”--and of being-two-to-act and of being-two-to-
witness--for the writing of the “I” is the writing of doubleness precisely because the first 
person singular does not appear as such.  Rather, the writing “I” is always inscribed in 
advance by its double.  In this sense, Stephen’s memoir--his fiction of self--speaks 
doubly to the experience of having a secret sharer, one who reveals his transgressions.  
But as a memior, there is a doubling of voices that calls attention to the duplicity of the 
narrative:  Stephen’s voice is duplicated by Felix and signed by Brown.  The movement 
of the text, in essence, functions along the same lines as Carwin’s ventriloquism in 
Brown’s Wieland, for it constructs a model of a duplicity that confounds an original.   
 Stephen Calvert calls attention to the fact that the law as text is double.  For when 
reading the law, we find ourselves constantly brought back again and again to the text by 
paradoxes of the double and of repetition.  Such doubleness of the law in language, as 
Derrida points out, blurs “the boundary lines between ‘imagination’ and ‘reality,’ 
between the ‘symbol’ and the ‘thing it symbolizes’..., the considerations on the double 
meanings of words” (Dissemination 220).  But it is important to note that the figure of the 
double not only mimics the doubleness of the law, but the double also confounds the 
law’s “foundational” principles.  The double has the power to efface identity--to conflate 
self and other--and, as such, the double can efface the legal procedures of due process 
and the rights of the accused.  For if “I” is another, then the accused is also potentially the 
Other.  The double, then, has the authority to, through duplicity, rob the self of legal 
statutes designed to protect the individual.  To put this another way, it is necessary for the 
law to operate under the sign of unity: it can work only if there is a single source of 
identity that relates to the accused.  When that source of identity is double, the role of the 
law is effaced and legal procedures cannot handle the multiple or the proliferative. In the 
end, due process is denied. 
 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
Bennett, Maurice J.  “A Portrait of the Artist in Eighteenth-Century America: Charles 
Brockden Brown’s Memoirs of Stephen Calvert.”  William and Mary Quarterly 39.3 
(July 1982): 492-507. 
 
Bersani, Leo.  “Is the Rectum a Grave?” AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism.  Ed. 
Douglas Crimp.  Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.  210-223. 
 
Borchers, Hans.  Introduction.  Memoirs of Stephen Calvert. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1978.  
ix-xxvii. 
 
Brooks, Peter. “The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric.” In Law’s Stories: Narrative and 
Rhetoric in the Law. Edited by Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz. New Haven: Yales UP, 
1996. 14-22.   
 
Brown, Charles Brockden.  Memoirs of Stephen Calvert.  In Alcuin: A Dialogue and 
Memoirs of Stephen Calvert.  Kent: Kent State UP, 1977.  71-272.  
 
A Collection of the Constitutions of the Thirteen United States of North America. 
Philadelphia: John Bryce, 1793. 
 
Coke, Edward. The Second Part of the Institutes of the laws of England. 1608. Buffalo, 
N.Y.: William S. Hein, 1986. 
 
Constable, Marianne. Just Silences. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005. 
 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America. 
Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2000. 
 
Derrida, Jacques.  “Aphorism Countertime.” In Acts of Literature. Ed. Derek Attridge.  
New York: Routledge, 1992.  
  
- - -. Dissemination.  Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1981.    
 
Fehrenbacher, D. E. The Dred Scott Case. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1978. 
 
Ferguson, Robert A.  Law and Letters in American Culture. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 
1984. 
 
Grabo, Norman S.  The Coincidental Art of Charles Brockden Brown. Chapel Hill: U of 
North Carolina P, 1981.   
 
Hamilton, Alexander. “Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections.” The Papers of 
Alexander Hamilton. Ed. Harold C. Syrett, et. al. New York: Columbia UP, 1979.  
 
Higginbotham, A. Leon. In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process. 
Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1980. 
 “Historical Essay.” In Alcuin: A Dialogue and Memoirs of Stephen Calvert.  Kent: Kent 
State UP, 1977. 273-312. 
 
Orth, John V. Due Process of Law: A Brief History. Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 2003.  
 
Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Courts of King’s Bench and Common 
Pleas. Volume 2. London: L and R Brooke, 1792. 
 
Royle, Nicholas.  The Uncanny.  Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003. 
 
Shapiro, Stephen.  “‘Man to Man I Needed Not to Dread His Encounter’: Edgar Huntly’s 
End of Erotic Pessimism.” Revising Charles Brockden Brown: Culture, Politics, and 
Sexuality in the Early Republic. Edited by Philip Barnard, Mark L. Kamrath, and Stephen 
Shapiro. Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 2004.  216-51.  
 
Zilversmit, Arthur. The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North. 
Chicago: U pf Chicago P, 1967. 
 
 
 
